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Future crewed missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) represent a logistical challenge
that is unprecedented in human spaceflight. Astronauts will travel farther and stay in space
for longer than any previous mission, far from timely abort or resupply from Earth. Under
these conditions, supportability – defined as the set of system characteristics that influence
the logistics and support required to enable safe and effective operations of systems – will
be a much more significant driver of space system lifecycle properties than it has been in
the past. This paper presents an overview of supportability for future human spaceflight.
The particular challenges of future missions are discussed, with the differences between
past, present, and future missions highlighted. The relationship between supportability
metrics and mission cost, performance, schedule, and risk is also discussed. A set of pro-
posed strategies for managing supportability is presented – including reliability growth,
uncertainty reduction, level of repair, commonality, redundancy, In-Space Manufacturing
(ISM) (including the use of material recycling and In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) for
spares and maintenance items), reduced complexity, and spares inventory decisions such as
the use of predeployed or cached spares – along with a discussion of the potential impacts
of each of those strategies. References are provided to various sources that describe these
supportability metrics and strategies, as well as associated modeling and optimization tech-
niques, in greater detail. Overall, supportability is an emergent system characteristic and
a holistic challenge for future system development. System designers and mission planners
must carefully consider and balance the supportability metrics and decisions described in
this paper in order to enable safe and effective beyond-LEO human spaceflight.
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EMTT External Maintenance Task Team
FDM Fused Deposition Modeling
IMLEO Initial Mass in Low Earth Orbit
ISM In-Space Manufacturing
ISRU In-Situ Resource Utilization
ISS International Space Station
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LoC Loss of Crew
LoM Loss of Mission
LoV Loss of Vehicle
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
MADS Maintenance and Analysis Data Set
MTBF Mean Time Betwen Failures
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
NRC National Research Council
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit
P(LoC) Probability of Loss of Crew
P(LoM) Probability of Loss of Mission
P(LoV) Probability of Loss of Vehicle
PACT Probability and Confidence Tradespace
POS Probability of Sufficiency
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance
SRU Shop Replaceable Unit
SSF Space Station Freedom
I. Introduction
Future crewed missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) represent a logistical challenge that is unprece-dented in human spaceflight. Astronauts will travel farther from Earth than ever before, and stay in space
for longer without resupply from home or the option of timely abort in the event of an emergency. Under
these conditions, supportability will be a much more significant driver of space system lifecycle properties –
especially cost and risk – than it has been in the past.1–8 This paper presents an overview of supportability,
including a discussion of the challenges presented by future missions and the relationship of supportability
metrics to mission-level cost, performance, schedule, and risk. In addition, the set of decisions that must be
made to determine a system’s supportability strategy are discussed, along with their potential impacts on
supportability metrics and various couplings between them.
A. Supportability
Supportability is a metric describing the ease with which a particular system can be supported in a given
context, as a function of a broad set of system characteristics that drive the amount of logistics and support
resources required to enable safe and effective system operations.1,9 Logistics and support resources include
physical resources such as spares and consumables, as well as temporal resources such as maintenance crew
hours. Some resource demands are effectively deterministic, such as those related to life-limited maintenance
items that are replaced on a regular schedule, or consumables that are used at a known rate. Other demands,
particularly those related to spare parts required to repair random failures, are stochastic. As a result,
supportability is fundamentally a trade between risk and resources. Specifically, a system’s supportability
defines the minimum amount of resources that must be allocated in order to achieve a desired level of risk
mitigation in a given context.
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The core challenge of system supportability management is balancing logistics mass, crew time, and
risk in order to achieve mission and campaign objectives in a safe and cost-effective manner. Some broad
supportability-related considerations include:
• Reliability: the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a given period of time,
under a given set of operating conditions1,10–12
• Maintainability: the ease with which a system can be maintained, as a function of the set of system,
component, and crew characteristics that allow for or reduce the cost and difficulty of maintenance
activities during operations1,2, 9, 12
• Repairability:a the ease with which components can be repaired by the crew after a failure occurs1
• Redundancy: the incorporation of additional copies of a given system element in order to mitigate the
impact of a failure1,12
• Sparing Philosophy: the set of decisions regarding the number and type of spare parts carried, including
design decisions regarding commonality, level of repair, and other factors that determine the set of
repairable items, as well as operational decisions such as spare parts allocations for pre-deployment
and/or carry-along1
Each of these elements of supportability encompasses a set of interrelated design and operational decisions
that must be made – explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously – during system development and
deployment. These decisions, once made, define the supportability of the system.
While each of the characteristics described above – and each underlying decisions driving them – influences
system supportability, it is important to note that no individual decision or characteristic fully encapsulates
supportability. Supportability is a holistic, emergent characteristic of a system. It does not result from any
single subsystem, nor any single system characteristic. Coupled, nonlinear interactions between risk/resource
trades associated with all elements of a system drive overall supportability characteristics. Therefore, holistic
systems analysis is required to understand the trade between logistics mass, crew time, and risk and assess
supportability.
B. Importance of Including Supportability in Early Design and Architecture Decisions
Decisions made early in the development of a system can have a very strong impact on overall system cost.
In general, it is estimated that 80% of total system lifecycle cost will be determined (i.e. “locked in”) after
only approximately 20% of that cost has been spent.13 Montgomery14 notes that operational support costs
typically account for 60-80% of total program costs. By definition, these costs occur during operations, later
in the system lifecycle; however, the decisions that defined these costs – or, more precisely, the cost-risk
tradespace available to system operators – were made earlier, during concept development and design.
Systems that neglect supportability and logistics during the system architecture and design process may,
in application, be significantly and potentially unexpectedly more expensive to operate than systems that
consider supportability during those phases of the project lifecycle. In addition, supportability issues may not
become apparent until after hardware is manufactured and integrated, by which point design changes may be
excessively expensive to implement and more complex and/or expensive operations strategies may be the only
viable option to mitigate risk. For example, Space Shuttle operations and maintenance activities were made
more complex and expensive due to a lack of interchangeability and accessibility for certain components.
Partially as a result of those and other supportability lessons learned from the Shuttle program, logistics
and supportability was included as a consideration during early International Space Station (ISS) concept
development.14
One example of the application of supportability analysis during system development is the Space Station
Freedom (SSF) External Maintenance Task Team (EMTT) Report, also known as the Fisher-Price study.15
The EMTT was formed in 1990, when a preliminary analysis of external maintenance crew time demands for
SSF (a precursor to the ISS) found that they may exceed planning allocations by an order of magnitude. The
team performed an in-depth analysis of the expected number of failures and amount of maintenance crew
time that could be expected for SSF, based on estimates of system characteristics. This analysis provided
valuable results illustrating the prohibitively high crew time demands that the then-current design would
aSometimes spelled “reparability”
3 of 21
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
have imposed, and informed a set of recommendations for changes to design and operations planning in order
to reduce that demand.15,16
The conditions under which future systems will operate (described in greater detail in Section II) are
unprecedented in human spaceflight. Astronauts will fly their systems far from home, staying in space for
longer than ever before, with limited or no option for timely abort or resupply in the event of an emergency.
Under these conditions, it is expected that supportability will be a much more significant driver of crewed
space system lifecycle properties than it has been in the past. In addition, strategies that have been effective
for past missions may not be as effective, or even feasible, for future missions. It is therefore critical
that supportability be carefully considered early in campaign planning and system development for future
missions.1–6
C. Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses supportability challenges for fu-
ture human spaceflight missions, comparing the context of a mission to Mars to past and present human
spaceflight experience. Section III describes key supportability metrics and how they influence mission-level
cost, performance, schedule, and risk. Section IV discusses proposed strategies to improve supportability
for future spaceflight missions and the potential impacts that they might have on the factors described in
Section III. Section V discusses other considerations, including data needs for supportability analysis, and
Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Future Supportability Challenges
Future human spaceflight missions beyond LEO will be unlike any previous human spaceflight experience.
The horizon goal of human spaceflight is to land humans on Mars and return them safely to the Earth.17
On missions such as this, crews will fly farther from home than ever before, and remain in space for longer.
Resupply and abort options will be heavily constrained, if they are available at all. Without resupply options,
mission endurance, defined as the amount of time that a system must sustain the crew without resupply,18
will be significantly increased from that of past missions. When abort options are limited and the crew does
not have a way to quickly return to Earth in the event of an emergency, the criticality of various system
failure modes increases. The combination of these factors – long endurance missions without timely options
for abort or resupply – creates an unprecedented supportability challenge for future missions. Strategies that
have supported human spaceflight operations in LEO and on short trips to the Moon will not be effective
for future missions to Mars or other beyond-LEO destinations. New approaches to supportability will need
to be developed.1–8
The longest crewed mission beyond LEO to date – and the most recent instance of beyond-LEO human
spaceflight – is Apollo 17, which lasted approximately 12.5 days in December 1972.19 The longest Space
Shuttle mission occurred at the end of 1996, when STS-80 spent over 17 days in LEO.20 In both cases, there
was no resupply during the mission. As a result, the mission endurance is equal to the duration. However,
when resupply is used, endurance can be much shorter than duration; the overall long-endurance mission
is broken up into a series of short-endurance segments. This is the case, for example, on the current state-
of-the-art in long-duration human spaceflight, the ISS, which has sustained a continuous human presence
in LEO for nearly 17 years, since November 2, 2000.21 However, this exceptionally long mission duration
has been supported by regular resupply missions that occur approximately every three months. As a result,
station mission endurance is approximately 90 days. In addition, in all of these cases (Apollo, Shuttle, ISS,
and all other previous human spaceflight programs) the crew had the ability to abort and return to Earth
in a matter of days, if not hours.
In contrast, a Mars transit habitat must be able to support a crew in deep space – without resupply or
timely abort – for 1,000 to 1,200 days.22,23 While a 1,200 day mission is only approximately one fifth of
the total ISS crewed mission duration to date, it is over 13.3 times longer than ISS endurance, and 96 times
longer than Apollo 17. In short, the mission endurance required for Mars systems is an order of magnitude
greater than that of LEO missions, and nearly two orders of magnitude greater than the longest period of
time that any crew has ever spent beyond LEO.
The distinction between duration and endurance is important because endurance defines the planning
time horizon for logistics. Many resource demands are driven by stochastic processes, and longer planning
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Table 2. Summary of supportability metrics and corresponding mission-level metrics.




Extent of Redesign for Maintainability
Investment in Reliability Growth
Investment in Uncertainty Reduction
Performance Crew Time Required for Maintenance and Repair
Schedule Test Time for Reliability Growth
Test Time for Uncertainty Reduction
Required Number of Launches
Risk Probability of Sufficient Spares Maintenance Materials
Probability of Sufficient Crew Time for Maintenance and Repair
Probability of Crew Maintenance and Repair Time Saturation
Confidence in Probability Assessments, Given Epistemic Uncertainty
time horizons result in greater uncertainty. As a result, more resources must be allocated on a long-endurance
mission in order to mitigate risk than would be required for a mission of an equivalent duration broken up
into segments of shorter endurance. On a long-duration, short-endurance mission such as the ISS, resupply
can be used to replenish stores of spare parts and consumables as they are used, reducing uncertainty. This
reduces logistics requirements, since a relatively small buffer of on-orbit spares can be used to cover potential
failures in the short term, with new ones supplied from the ground as needed. In contrast, a long-endurance
system must carry all spares to cover potential failures across a much longer time period. While the overall
number of failures that will actually be experienced may be low, there is no way to know beforehand which
items will fail, and how many times. For example, it is estimated that more than 95% of spares allocated
to cover random failures on the ISS will not be used. However, a large number of spares must be carried for
risk mitigation since it is unknown which specific ones will be needed.1
Endurance is also the key factor when considering the criticality of different failure modes. In LEO, the
availability of rapid abort and resupply options means that the crew are well-protected in the event of an
emergency. While a failure event that forces an abort may result in Loss of Mission (LoM), only a subset
of potential failures – specifically, those with a short time to critical impact after failure, such as a loss of
pressure event – are likely to result in Loss of Crew (LoC) in LEO. On long-endurance missions with limited
abort capability, a much larger set of potential failures directly threaten crew survival, due to the lack of
this contingency option. Under these circumstances, the ability of the crew to maintain spacecraft systems,
and therefore the supportability of the system, will be much more critical.1,3
III. Supportability Metrics and Mission-Level Impacts
The purpose of supportability analysis, as with all other system architecture and design disciplines, is
to support the creation of effective systems. Specifically, analysis efforts characterize tradeoffs between cost,
performance, schedule, and risk – and, perhaps more importantly, how those metrics relate to architecture and
design choices – in order to inform decision-making during system and mission development. Supportability
influences overall mission cost, performance, schedule, and risk in several ways. This section outlines a set
of key supportability metrics, summarized in Table 2, that influence mission-level metrics. The relationship
between each supportability metric and its associated mission metric is also briefly described. This list
should not be taken as an exhaustive enumeration of all system- and mission-level impacts of supportability,
nor of all supportability metrics that may be valuable to track during system development; however, it may
provide a good starting point and overview for supportability analysis planning.
It is important to note that in this discussion each supportability impact is examined independently.
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This is effectively an “all else being equal” assessment of the effects of that specific factor. In practice, a
change in one element that would have a particular impact on a mission-level metric could (and often would)
be mitigated through a change in some other aspect of the mission. For example, though an increase in
logistics requirements could affect mission schedules by requiring additional launches – which at a limited
launch cadence would require an extended launch timeline – this effect could be mitigated by increasing the
launch cadence, or accepting higher levels of risk to reduce logistics loads. However, all of these potential
mitigations have impacts on other metrics. All of these factors are coupled in some way, and a change in
any one of them typically has impacts that can ripple through an entire mission. However, for the purposes
of understanding the impacts of each of these supportability metrics at a high level, each is considered in
isolation.
A. Cost
One of the most direct impacts of supportability on cost comes in the form of logistics requirements. Sup-
portability resources include consumables, spare parts, and other maintenance items. In this context, “main-
tenance items” refers to items with limited lifetime that are replaced on a regular schedule. “Spares,” on
the other hand, refers to items that are used to fill demands resulting from random failures.22 Similarly, the
activity associated with the use of a maintenance item is referred to as “maintenance,” and “repair” refers
to the use of a spare part after a random failure. The supportability characteristics of the system determine
the amount of logistics that must be supplied in order to mitigate risk to a given level. Increased logistics
requirements imply increased total mass and volume, as well as an increased infrastructure cost related to
packaging, storing, and transporting these logistics items. As a result, supportability directly impacts launch
costs.
Mass is a commonly-used proxy metric for cost in space mission development, due to the high cost
associated with launch to and transportation in space.24 Initial Mass in Low Earth Orbit (IMLEO) is
typically used as a metric which captures the total mass that must be launched to LEO for a given mission,
including not only logistics and equipment but also the fuel required to perform necessary maneuvers over the
course of the mission, as well as infrastructure costs such as packaging material. However, it is important to
note that mass is a proxy metric, and does not capture all aspects of cost.25 For example, in addition to being
launched, these supportability items must also be procured. For some resources, such as water, procurement
costs may be low. Other items – particularly spare parts for complex systems – may have significantly higher
costs. The cost of procuring resources for the mission, including storage and transportation costs on the
ground, should also be considered.
Finally, supportability-related changes to a system may incur significant development costs. This includes
both the design (and/or redesign) of systems for maintainability and reliability, as well as testing to confirm
those characteristics. Testing – including both ground testing and on-orbit operational experience – is critical
to understanding the supportability characteristics of a system. As discussed in Section III.D, component
failure rates cannot be measured directly; test time is required to reduce epistemic uncertainty in failure
rate estimates, as well as to confirm that predicted failure rates are accurate to within a certain level
of confidence. In addition, reliability growth requires investment of both time and financial resources to
perform tests, identify failure modes, and change designs or operational practices to mitigate them. The cost
of reliability growth trends exponentially; that is, while early failure modes may be detected and corrected
for relatively low cost, each additional increase in reliability (i.e. reduction in failure rate) incurs significantly
increasing cost.26–28
Importantly, reliability growth and uncertainty reduction are two separate, yet strongly interrelated,
activities. The former involves making changes to the system in order to mitigate failure modes; the latter
consists of simply observing the system in order to learn more about its behavior. When changes are made to
a system, the impact of those changes on uncertainty in system failure rates and other characteristics must
be carefully considered. It may be the case that past observations are no longer as applicable, and failure
rate estimates based on previous data should be discounted and uncertainty increased. However, these two
activities may be performed concurrently for different parts of the system. For example, testing of a system
that is focused on improving the reliability of a specific Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) could also provide
data that can be used to reduce failure rate uncertainty in other ORUs, even if uncertainty is increased or
held constant for the ORU undergoing upgrades.
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B. Performance
One core objective of human exploration missions is the safe delivery a crew to an exploration destination in
order to perform utilization activities such as completing exploration objectives and scientific investigations.
Utilization activities output is one metric for mission performance; the more utilization that can be done,
the more productive and higher-performing the mission is. Utilization activities require time from the crew,
and therefore the amount of crew time available for these activities, or utilization time, is a metric for the
performance of a given mission. Missions with more utilization time can achieve higher performance through
greater crew productivity, which results in higher scientific output. Conversely, a reduction in available
utilization time corresponds to a reduction in mission performance due to a reduction in productivity.
Crew time is a valuable and limited resource on space missions. In addition to performing utilization
activities, the crew must spend time maintaining their health via activities such as eating, sleeping, and
exercise as well as maintaining spacecraft systems by performing required maintenance and repair. Since any
time spent on maintenance and repair activities cannot be spent on utilization, this maintenance and repair
time therefore reduces the productivity, or performance, of the mission. The supportability characteristics of
a system, such as failure rates and maintenance crew time requirements (typically reported in terms of Mean
Time To Repair (MTTR)), strongly influence how much time the crew must spend performing maintenance
and repair activities. As with spares logistics, the amount of crew time that will actually be required over
the course of the mission is uncertain, and therefore crew time allocation is a trade between the amount
of crew time that is provided for maintenance and repair and the risk that not enough crew time will be
available.1,6, 7, 29,30
Experience with maintenance and repair on LEO space stations has shown that maintenance and repair
crew time is a significant challenge. In practice, maintenance and repair crew time demands have been higher
than expected, and as a result system productivity has been lower.7,29,30 For example, the amount of crew
time associated with maintenance and repair of the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support Systems
(ECLSS) during station operations has exceeded the amount specified in design documents by more than an
order of magnitude; whereas it was initially estimated that only approximately 1 hour per week of crew time
would be required, ISS ECLSS maintenance and repair has accounted for approximately 13 to 15 hours of
crew time per week.29,30
The high maintenance and repair crew time demand experienced on the ISS is indicative of a particular
challenge for future missions, given that the ISS supportability strategy was specifically designed to minimize
crew time spent on maintenance and repair by packaging components into ORUs. This approach saves crew
time by simplifying maintenance and repair activities, but it also increases logistics mass by reducing the mass
efficiency of spare parts allocations.7,31 When ORUs are used, each spare part replacement removes not only
the specific item that failed, but also any other items packaged within the same ORU – items which may have a
significant amount of useful lifetime remaining. Implementing repair at a lower level is a commonly-discussed
supportability strategy that can enable more efficient maintenance and repair logistics, thereby reducing
logistics mass; however, it also tends to have the effect of increasing the amount of crew time necessary for
maintenance and repair activities.1,32 Any new approaches to supportability must carefully consider their
impact on crew time, and by extension their impact on mission productivity and performance.1,6
Supportability is also a strong driver of logistics requirements (see Section III.A). In addition to affecting
costs, changes in logistics requirements can also affect the amount of cargo space that can be allocated to
utilization for a given mission, given other transportation system or infrastructure constraints. A reduction in
logistics may therefore allow a mission to carry more equipment for scientific investigation or other utilization
purposes, thus increasing the performance of the mission.
C. Schedule
The supportability characteristics of a system, and the strategies used to improve them, can impact the
development and operations schedule of a system in addition to its physical characteristics. As noted
in Section III.D, a core driver of the supportability challenge is uncertainty, including both aleatory and
epistemic sources. Test time and operational experience are critical factors in understanding this uncertainty
and implementing changes to the system in order to improve reliability and potentially reduce logistics mass.
In order to increase the reliability of a component (i.e. reduce its failure rate), failure modes must be
observed and corrected. A significant amount of test time may be required to achieve significant reliability
growth, however. Analysis of historical failure rates and efforts to improve them has shown that failure
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rate reduction tends to follow a power law relationship with time; each additional amount of time spent on
reliability growth produces diminishing returns.11,28,33–35
Test time is also critical for reducing the epistemic uncertainty associated with failure rates, which is a
critical factor in supportability assessment.8,36 This uncertainty can be reduced by observing component
behavior over time. The result of reduced uncertainty is increased precision in spares forecasting, which can
reduce the amount of logistics mass required to achieve a desired level of risk mitigation for a mission. Unlike
reliability growth efforts, uncertainty reduction can be performed without making changes to the system.
Program planning must take into account the test time required to increase reliability or reduce uncertainty,
especially when new or significantly upgraded systems are being deployed for the first time.
Supportability can also affect schedule during mission preparation and operations. Given a limited launch
capability (in terms of cadence, launch vehicle capacity, and/or other factors), an increase in logistics mass
or volume may result in the need for additional launches. These additional launches can extend the mission
timeline and increase the amount of time needed to prepare for and deploy given mission. This extended
timeline can affect hardware delivery dates and on-orbit waiting periods for other hardware, especially for
missions to destinations such as Mars, which have limited launch windows.
D. Risk
Risk, defined as the combination of the probability that an event will occur and the impact that will result if
that event does occur,37 is at the core of supportability assessment and management. A typical approach to
risk assessment for human spaceflight mission design is to estimate the probability associated with a set of
particular events or outcomes using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The three events most commonly
examined for crewed mission PRA are LoM, Loss of Vehicle (LoV), and LoC. The corresponding probabilities
for each event – Probability of Loss of Mission (P(LoM)), Probability of Loss of Vehicle (P(LoV)), and
Probability of Loss of Crew (P(LoC)) – provide key risk metrics for that mission, usually used along with
a given threshold value to define requirements.38 For example, Apollo program risk requirements specified
that P(LoM) be no greater than 0.01 and P(LoC) no greater than 0.001 on any given mission.39 As noted in
Section II, on a long-endurance mission with limited (or nonexistent) abort and resupply options, an inability
to maintain critical systems such as ECLSS could result, depending on the circumstance, in LoM, LoV, or
LoC. Therefore, supportability is a key contributor to overall mission risk. Specifically, system supportability
characteristics define the risk-resource trade for a particular system in a given context, and key risk metrics
are related to the probability that the amount of resources provided are sufficient for a given mission.
Two major types of uncertainty – aleatory and epistemic – drive risk associated with supportability.
Aleatory uncertainty results from randomness that is inherent to the process being examined. Epistemic
uncertainty, on the other hand, results from a lack of knowledge about the process being examined.38 While
epistemic uncertainty can be reduced through experience as data are gathered and knowledge of the system
is improved, aleatory uncertainty is intrinsic and irreducible.40
As an example, consider the roll of a die. The outcome of the roll, given known probabilities associated
with each potential outcome, is associated with aleatory uncertainty. If the probabilities associated with
particular outcomes are unknown – for instance, if the die has an unknown bias – then epistemic uncertainty
is also present. This epistemic uncertainty can be reduced via measurement and analysis, for example by
observing a series of die rolls. However, the aleatory uncertainty present in the outcome of the die roll itself
will not be reduced by observing rolls, even once any bias present in the die is precisely characterized. In
order to accurately forecast the the behavior of the die, both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty need to be
taken into account.
Supportability risk is primarily associated with the allocation of resources, including physical resources
such as spare parts and maintenance items as well as non-physical resources such as crew time allocated
for maintenance and repair activities. In addition, past spaceflight experience has highlighted the impact
of unanticipated effects, or “unknown unknowns,” on system supportability. These risks are discussed in
greater detail below.
1. Spares and Maintenance Resources
In the context of supportability, aleatory uncertainty typically relates to the number of failures that may be
experienced by a particular item with a known failure rate over the course of a mission, which is a random
variable. The distribution of the number of failures that may be experienced can be used to determine the
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number of spares that must be provided in order to achieve a desired Probability of Sufficiency (POS), a
metric defined as the probability that the number of spares provided is sufficient to cover all maintenance
demands during a given period of time.40,41 POS is a function of a variety of factors, depending on the
complexity of the model being used. These typically include mission endurance, item failure rates (or Mean
Times Between Failures (MTBFs)), and the number of spares provided.
POS can be assessed using a wide variety of stochastic modeling techniques, including Poisson, Binomial,
Markov, and Semi-Markov models, Monte Carlo mission simulation, or combinations of various methods.42
Some models assess system-level POS directly, while others assess POS for each repairable item in the system
independently, then multiply them together to obtain the system POS. While POS is typically applied in the
context of traditional spare parts, it can also be adapted to consider more advanced supportability strategies
such as In-Space Manufacturing (ISM). In this context, POS refers to the probability that the amount
of raw materials, or feedstock, provided for ISM will be sufficient to manufacture all required items.43,44
Overall, the probability that sufficient spare parts, feedstock, and other physical maintenance resources is a
critical risk consideration for supportability. An in-depth discussion of risk, reliability, and POS modeling is
beyond the scope of this paper; however, a selection of references is provided here that include more detailed
descriptions of various modeling approaches.1,2, 8, 15,16,27,32,37,38,40–59
Epistemic uncertainty is also a critical consideration for spares and maintenance logistics.8,36 When fail-
ure rates are (or, at least, are assumed to be) deterministically known, POS for a given item is a deterministic
value. However, a component’s failure rate cannot be directly measured. Instead, it must be estimated based
on similarity to other components and/or statistical analysis of observed behavior. For example, the failure
rate estimates for ISS ORUs are updated based on observed failures using a Bayesian approach, as described
by Vitali and Lutomski60 and Anderson et al.40 An analysis by Stromgren et al.8 found that, of the items
in Maintenance and Analysis Data Set (MADS) – the data set used by ISS Safety and Mission Assurance
(S&MA) to track reliability characteristics for all ISS ORUs – that have had their reliability estimates
change as a result of Bayesian updates, approximately 85% of MTBF values were adjusted upwards (indi-
cating higher than predicted reliability), while 15% were adjusted downwards. While Bayesian updating of
failure rate estimates can reduce uncertainty in these estimates over time, some amount of epistemic uncer-
tainty remains. If test/operational experience is relatively limited or the number of test articles is small – as
is often the case for human spaceflight when compared to, for example, the aviation or automotive industries
– a significant amount of epistemic uncertainty may be present in failure rate estimates.40 This means that
assessment of POS values (which are a function of failure rates) result in a distribution of possible values
rather than a point estimate. To account for this epistemic uncertainty, analysts must consider not only
POS but also confidence, a measure of fidelity of the estimate typically expressed in terms of the probability
that the real-world POS value is greater than or equal to the estimated value.40 Both aleatory and epistemic
uncertainty are critical considerations for supportability analyses, especially for long-endurance missions.
Previous analyses have shown that if epistemic uncertainty is not taken into account during supportability
analyses, the results can severely underestimate risk and/or logistics mass requirements for long-endurance
missions.8,36
2. Crew Time
The availability of required maintenance materials is necessary, but not sufficient, for successful maintenance.
The crew must also have time to implement required repairs.1,6, 7, 29,30 Therefore POS must also be extended
to apply to crew time. Unlike spare parts, crew time is a general resource; that is, crew time is not specialized
to a particular application, and can be used as needed. However, it is also a limited resource, both in terms of
the total amount of crew time available (measured in crew-hours) and in terms of the number of simultaneous
or overlapping demands for crew time that occur. The total amount of crew time that will be required over
the course of a mission is stochastic, a function of the number of failures that will occur, as well as the amount
of time required to implement repairs for each failure (expressed either as a repair time distribution or MTTR
estimate). Some assessment approaches examine expected maintenance crew time requirements,15,16,48 while
others assess the distribution of the total amount of crew time required, and therefore the POS associated
with a given allocation of crew time to maintenance activities.6
In addition to the risk that the total amount of crew time available for maintenance may be exceeded,
there is also a risk that a cluster of maintenance demands may overwhelm the crew’s maintenance capacity,
especially for critical systems. When a critical system such as ECLSS fails, there is a limited time to perform
maintenance before the loss of functionality results in LoM, LoV, or LoC. The crew must repair the failure
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before an unrecoverable hazard condition is reached. If multiple failures occur in quick succession, or if
there is an ongoing high cadence of maintenance demands within the system, the crew’s ability to implement
repairs may be saturated and overwhelmed. Given the small crew size for a mission to Mars, the amount of
maintenance crew time “bandwidth” may be very limited, especially when other mission critical activities
such as docking, orbital maneuvers, Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL), or launch/ascent are underway. As
such, the probability that the crew’s repair capacity will be overwhelmed at any given moment in the mission
timeline must also be considered. As with spares and maintenance resources, both aleatory and epistemic
uncertainty must be taken into account when assessing maintenance crew time demands.
3. Unknown Unknowns
The above risk factors are only some of the many contributions to overall system risk, and the assessment
techniques that generate POS and confidence estimates are only as valid as the data that are used as inputs.
However, these data can only account for known or anticipated factors. Unknown or unanticipated effects can
have significant implications for system supportability that must be kept in mind during system development.
For example, the ISS ECLSS system has experienced several instances of component failure and/or degraded
performance due to unanticipated issues,18,44 including significantly reduced component lifetimes due to dust
and debris impingement,61,62 seal material degradation,63 component manufacturing and assembly errors,63
or even changes in the concentration of calcium in crew urine due to physiological changes resulting from
the microgravity environment.63,64 Distributions on the values of failure rates or other parameters can be
used to account for some of this uncertainty, but unknown risks will always remain.
For future missions to new destinations, unknowns resulting from the exploration destination itself –
such as resource availabilities and/or environmental conditions and their effects on the crew and mission
hardware – will be even more prevalent. These “unknown unknowns” are, by definition, unknown. However,
historically they have had a detrimental impact on system supportability, introducing additional risk factors.
Therefore, probabilistic assessments of risk should be seen as a bound, rather than a guarantee; when risk
factors beyond the scope of the analysis (known and unknown) are included, the actual risk will almost
certainly be higher.
IV. Supportability Strategy Decisions
A supportability strategy is the collection of architecture, design, and operational decisions that influence
the supportability of a system and, by extension, the system characteristics described in Section III. These
decisions each have different, often coupled, and sometimes conflicting impacts on mass, risk, crew time,
and other characteristics of the system. They occur at various points in the system development timeline,
from concept generation and architecture synthesis, through design and testing, all the way to operations.
Key supportability strategy decisions for human spaceflight missions are listed and described below, based
on descriptions in various sources and lessons learned from previous supportability analyses.1,8, 15,36,44,65
As with the metrics described in Section III, this list is not necessarily exhaustive. The potential impacts
that each decision could have on high-level metrics is described briefly, as well as major couplings with other
supportability strategy decisions.
A. Reliability Growth
Reliability growth is a commonly-discussed tactic to reduce logistics mass for long-endurance missions.5
However, longer mission endurance results in increased probability that a failure will occur, even for high-
reliability components.27,51 On very long missions, such as a mission to Mars and back, an unrealistically
high reliability would be required to provide high confidence that no spares are required.28 Long-endurance
missions will almost certainly experience failures during flight for any reasonable component MTBF values,
and the crew will need to perform repairs in order to maintain system functions. The challenge, then, is not
to attempt to ensure that failures do not occur, but rather to accept that they will and design the system
to be able to recover from component failures via maintenance while minimizing the amount of resources
required.1,27,28,51
Increasing the reliability of a given component (measured in terms of MTBF or failure rate) reduces
the probability that the component will fail in a given period of time, thereby allowing the same POS to
be achieved with fewer spares. However, spares mass for systems with many different repairable items is
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driven more by the number of potential failures than the reliability of any one item. As a result, the value of
reliability growth for individual items, in terms of logistics mass reduction, may be limited.1,28 In particular,
since the overall POS for a set of repairable items is equal to the product of the POS for each individual
item, two important factors influence the amount of spares required to achieve system-level POS objectives.
First, the POS achieved by any individual item must significantly exceed the target system POS, since all
POS values are probabilities that are by definition between 0 and 1. Second, the system POS will always
be limited by the lowest item-level POS. As a result, while increased reliability for a subset of items may
produce some logistics mass reduction, continued reliability growth produces diminishing returns. While the
effect may be larger as more items experience increased reliability (even when all items are included), the
amount of reliability growth required to reduce logistics mass by a given amount increases rapidly.28
Reliability growth can also incur significant costs. Failure modes must be identified through testing or
operational experience, and the system or mission design must be changed to mitigate those failure modes.
As reliability increases, the amount of operations time required to observe a failure also increases, since the
failures occur at a lower rate. As a result, the amount of time required to increase the reliability of an item is
superlinear as a function of the amount of increase in MTBF desired – each additional increase in reliability
requires more testing time than the last to achieve.11,33,34 In addition, cost tends to grow exponentially with
higher MTBF targets.26,27,66 As a result, reliability growth efforts tend to produce diminishing returns, in
terms of logistics mass reduction per unit time or cost spent on reducing failure rates.28
This is not to say that improvements in reliability should not be pursued at all. On the contrary,
during the early phases of reliability growth efforts significant improvements in reliability may be achievable
relatively easily as major failure modes (i.e. ones associated with high failure rates) are identified and
corrected. The correction of failures that occur at a very high rate can provide significant benefits in terms
of overall system reliability and logistics mass. In addition, reliability also impacts crew time demands. A
system comprised of more reliable components will tend to experience fewer failures and require less crew time
for maintenance. Targeted reliability growth programs for specific, high-impact items – that is, items with
high mass, crew time requirements, and/or failure rates – may provide more efficient use of test resources
than broader efforts, since they can focus on items that are relatively early in the reliability-cost curve,
before the impact of diminishing returns is too strong. However, at a certain point the benefits of additional
reliability growth may no longer be worth the cost and time required. In addition, changes to system design
to improve reliability may result in increased epistemic uncertainty, which could have a detrimental effect
on logistics requirements (see Section IV.B).
Decisions regarding reliability growth efforts must balance the logistics mass and crew time reductions
that may be achieved against the test time and cost required for those improvements, as well as the potential
for increased uncertainty that may result from changes to the system design. Mission supportability analysis
that examines the sensitivities of various metrics with regard to the reliability can help identify when and
where reliability growth provides value and when it may be more cost-effective to pursue other strategies.
A more detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of reliability for long-endurance systems is presented by
Owens et al.28
A related consideration is component lifetime extension. Some items (e.g. filters) have logistics driven
not by the need for spares to cover random failures, but by scheduled replacements of those items when
they reach the end of their useful life. Increased lifetime for these components could also reduce logistics,
but again test time and operational experience is required to validate these increased lifetimes. Shelf life is
also a critical consideration in addition to operational lifetimes, particularly if spares are to be predeployed
(discussed further in Section IV.H). As with reliability growth, the amount of redesign effort and time
required to increase and validate a component lifetime must be weighed against the logistics mass and
maintenance crew time reductions that could be achieved by longer lifetimes.
B. Uncertainty Reduction
Supportability analyses must consider not only the estimated failure rates for components within the system,
but also epistemic uncertainty in those values. This epistemic uncertainty can have a very strong impact on
logistics and risk, described in greater detail in Section III.D. Reducing the amount of epistemic uncertainty
present in failure rate estimates can reduce the amount of logistics mass required to achieve a desired POS
and confidence value. More information about the behavior of the system, in the form of component lifetimes
and/or the number of repairs over a given period of time, enables more precise failure rate estimates, which
in turn enable more precise forecasts of maintenance demands.8,36
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For ISS logistics management, for example, failure rates and the associated uncertainty are tracked at the
ORU level in MADS. Each ORU has two parameters associated with it to describe reliability: a failure rate
estimate and an error factor. The failure rate estimate represents the mean failure rate, or the expected value
of the distribution of possible failure rates. The failure rate uncertainty distribution is typically modeled
as being lognormal, though a gamma distribution may also be used. The error factor, defined as the ratio
between the 95th and 50th percentiles in the lognormal distribution, captures the amount of uncertainty
present in the estimate. Together, the mean failure rate and error factor define the distribution of potential
failure rates. As ORUs fail during ISS operations, the associated mean failure rate and error factor are
updated using a Bayesian approach. Thus, as experience is gained the error factor tends to shrink and the
mean failure rate estimate tends to approach the true value. A more detailed description of the ISS Bayesian
update approach is presented by Anderson et al.40 and Vitali and Lutomski,60 and general approaches to
PRA and Bayesian analysis for space missions are described in greater detail by Stamatelatos and Dezfuli38
and Dezfuli et al.67
As with reliability growth (Section IV.A), the key to uncertainty reduction is test time and operational
experience. Unlike reliability growth, however, uncertainty reduction can be achieved through simple obser-
vation of system behavior; no changes to system design, manufacturing process, or operational procedures
are required. As a result, it is likely cheaper to reduce uncertainty than it is to increase reliability. Uncer-
tainty reduction can also be achieved without the risk of introducing new failure modes into the system, since
the system itself remains unchanged. However, reducing uncertainty around failure rate estimates does not
improve the characteristics of the system itself; it only improves understanding of the systems for analysts
and mission planners, enabling more effective supportability and logistics planning.36
Uncertainty reduction and reliability growth are not mutually exclusive. During all-up systems testing,
for example, a subset of components can be focused on for reliability growth while data are gathered on others
for uncertainty reduction. Failure modes discovered in items targeted for reliability growth are corrected,
while others are allowed to remain and studied in order to reduce uncertainty. In this way the reliability
of some components in the system can be improved, and the uncertainty in failure rate estimates for other
components is reduced simultaneously. The determination of whether or not an item is targeted for reliability
growth can be made based upon the impact of that item on logistics mass, crew time requirements, or other
factors. Alternatively, failure modes can be selected for reliability improvement dynamically as they are
discovered. For example, failure modes with associated failure rates below a given threshold could be
targeted for correction, while those with rates above the threshold can be left unchanged and monitored for
uncertainty reduction. The strategy used during testing and early “shakedown” operations depends upon
the particular system and mission context.
Overall, decisions regarding uncertainty reduction efforts must balance the potential impact of reduced
uncertainty on logistics and crew time requirements against the associated test time and cost. A more
detailed discussion of epistemic uncertainty in failure rates and its impact on supportability is presented by
Stromgren et al.8 and Owens et al.36
C. Level of Repair
Level of repair, also known as indenture, refers to the level in the parts hierarchy (system, subsystem,
assembly, component, etc.) at which repair actions are executed.1,41 For example, the Air Force uses the
terms Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) and Shop Replaceable Unit (SRU) to refer to items that are maintained
on the flight line or in a maintenance shop, respectively.41 Spaceflight applications typically refer to ORUs
in the place of LRUs.
Grouping components into ORUs can result in a more maintainable system by simplifying maintenance
activities and reducing the amount of time required for maintenance. This approach was used on the ISS,
for example, in order to reduce maintenance crew time demands.7,31 However, higher-level repair reduces
the mass-efficiency of maintenance; when components are grouped together into ORUs, the failure of a
single component within that ORU can force the replacement of all components when the entire ORU is
replaced. Items that may still have a significant amount of useful lifetime remaining before they fail are
replaced because of the failure of some other item in the same ORU. In contrast, lower-level repair can
result in significant reductions in spares mass requirements. Lower-level repair is more mass-efficient; for
example, when maintenance actions can be executed at the component rather than assembly level, all other
components within the assembly that are still functioning can remain in service and the mass of elements
that are replaced is lower than it would be in a higher-level repair paradigm.1,32 In addition, there may be
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more potential for commonality between lower-level items such as valves, sensors, fans, hoses, and manifolds
than there is between higher-level assemblies. Increased commonality enabled by lower level repair may
provide additional benefits (see Section IV.D).
However, lower level repair can increase the complexity of system development and maintenance opera-
tions. In order to enable effective lower-level repair, systems must be designed to enable access to lower-level
components, rather than collecting components into convenient boxes. Design for maintainability will place
additional constraints on the physical design of the system from the perspective of crew access, tool clear-
ances, potential hazards (sharp edges, containment for toxic materials, etc.), and sensing requirements for
diagnostics. Crews must have the knowledge and tools to execute maintenance activities at a lower level,
including diagnostic of system failures to identify failed components and removal/installation of those com-
ponents. There may be additional risk to the crew during more complex maintenance operations, as well
as an increased risk of unsuccessful maintenance. Increased complexity is also likely to increase the amount
of crew time required for maintenance, just as reduced complexity resulting from the implementation of
higher-level maintenance using ORUs is intended to reduce maintenance crew time. Decisions regarding
level of repair must carefully balance their impact on logistics mass, crew time, and the challenges of design
for lower-level maintenance.1
D. Commonality
Commonality is a maintenance strategy in which repairable items from different parts of the system are
designed to be interchangeable, meaning that a single type of spare can cover multiple types of failures. The
use of common components reduces the total number of spares that are required, since each additional spare
covers multiple sources of risk. In addition, common components can enable scavenging or cannibalization of
components from some systems to provide contingency spares for other, higher-criticality systems. Finally,
commonality can simplify inventory management and maintenance procedures by reducing the number of
different types of components that must be accounted for, as well as the number of different tools that may
be required to perform maintenance.1,68
Common components do not have to be identical, but they do need to be interchangeable with regard to
both form and function. Commonality can impose additional constraints on the component design process,
forcing the component to conform to requirements associated with multiple locations in the system. As a
result, the final design may not be as optimal in terms of local performance as it could be if it were specific
to a single installation point. However, the overall system characteristics may be significantly improved as
a result of the logistics benefits of commonality. In some cases, the loss of local optimality in component
design is more than made up for by the global optimality enabled at the system level.1
Commonality can increase the risk of common cause failures, since the same design is used multiple
times within the system. A common cause failure is a failure that occurs in different parts of a system for
the same reason.69 When the same design is reused, failure modes within that design – whether they arise
from design flaws, manufacturing flaws, unanticipated interactions, or any other source – become common
failure modes across multiple systems. As a result, failure modes within common components can be more
critical than those in individualized components, since they may impact wide swaths of system functionality.
This increased criticality should be taken into account during testing and evaluation of proposed common
component designs. However, the use of commonality increases the population of a given type of component
that is active in the system at a given time, providing more data for reliability growth and uncertainty
reduction (see Sections IV.A and IV.B). As a result, improvements to system reliability and/or failure rate
estimates may be achievable faster than they would be for a set of individual components. Therefore, while
the impact of a failure mode within a common component may be greater, the ability of system designers to
detect and understand/correct that failure mode is likely increased. Commonality also reduces the number
of different types of components that must be designed and evaluated, which may simplify development and
testing for the system. During system development, designers must carefully balance the impact of additional
constraints and common cause risks against the logistics mass reduction and simplification of development,
testing, and operations that may result from the implementation of commonality.
E. Redundancy
Redundancy addresses reliability issues in the same way as spare parts – additional copies of certain sys-
tem elements are provided so that if one fails, another can take its place. However, with redundancy the
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replacement item is already within the system; no crew time is required to execute a maintenance action
to install a new spare when failure occurs. This provides an additional benefit in that redundant compo-
nents can recover system functionality without crew intervention, thus significantly lowering risks associated
with loss of critical functions. Redundancy can be implemented at many levels within the system, from
individual components all the way to entire redundant systems. Level of redundancy considerations have
similar implications to level of repair, described in Section IV.C. Specifically, while high-level redundancy
may provide the ability to switch over to an entirely different system or subsystem when a failure occurs, it is
not a mass-efficient way to improve POS for the system.32 In addition, redundancy may consist of identical
copies of a system, or of different systems that accomplish the same function. The latter approach, known
as dissimilar redundancy, has the benefit of reducing the potential for common cause failures.
Analysis shows that multiple spares are needed to mitigate risk for most components.32,54 Since each
redundant instance of a system or subsystem effectively supplies only one additional spare for all items
within that system or subsystem, multiple redundant copies would be necessary to provide risk mitigation.
Spare parts are typically implemented at a lower level than redundancy, and are therefore typically a more
mass-efficient approach for risk mitigation. When combined with spare parts, however, redundancy can
provide a backup capability to maintain system function while maintenance activities are completed, giving
the crew more time to respond to failures. Thus, while redundancy may be valuable to preserve critical
system functions during maintenance downtime, it is unlikely to eliminate the need for spare parts as an
effective supportability strategy. Decisions regarding redundancy – including the level at which redundancy
is to be implemented, whether it is similar or dissimilar, and how many redundant elements to include –
impact system mass, risks associated with loss of function, and crew time required for maintenance.1
F. In-Space Manufacturing
ISM can enable the on-demand, in situ production of useful items from raw material feedstock and/or
low-level components. “Just-in-time” manufacturing can significantly reduce logistics mass requirements by
enabling the use of common raw materials to cover a variety of potential failures on-demand, eliminating the
need to specialize spares and maintenance items to particular components.43,44,70,71 This is effectively an ex-
tension of commonality (Section IV.D), and has similar effects in terms of broad risk coverage from common
resources. However, a key difference is that where commonality of spare parts imposes interchangeability
constraints on the design of the part itself, ISM imposes the need for common materials and for manufac-
turability within the constraints of ISM technology available to the mission. This commonality of material,
rather than commonality of design, can enable the application of the benefits of commonality more flexibly
than traditional implementation, especially as manufacturing technologies and capabilities advance.43,44
Recent technological advancements in Additive Manufacturing (AM), colloquially known as 3D printing,
have opened the door to more advanced manufacturing capabilities in space than have previously been
available, due to the fact that AM processes are automated (meaning they do not require excessive crew
time) and relatively resource-efficient when compared to traditional, subtractive manufacturing techniques.
However, it is important to note that ISM does not necessarily have to make use of AM, though there are
many benefits to AM which make it an attractive option. An extensive review of potential applications of
AM for spaceflight and the benefits that might result was published by the National Research Council (NRC)
in 2014.72 The first 3D printer in space, the 3D Printing in Zero-G Technology Demonstration Mission, was
delivered to the ISS in 2014 and has demonstrated the feasibility of ISM using Fused Deposition Modeling
(FDM) in a microgravity environment; initial results of this technology demonstration are reported by Prater
et al.73
In addition to enabling commonality of material and the resulting savings in logistics mass, ISM can
enable adaptable maintenance logistics. Traditional spare parts are specialized, covering specific failure
modes (or sets of failure modes, for common components). In contrast, raw materials provided for an ISM
system can be used to cover a wide variety of potential failure modes, and specific allocations of resources
to specific failure modes do not have to be made before launch. When traditional, individualized spares are
used, an unexpectedly high failure rate in a single component could exhaust the spares allocated to that item
before the end of the mission (potentially resulting in LoC, LoM, or LoV), even if other items experience
unexpectedly low failure rates and have a surplus of components. ISM enables the adaptive reallocation
of maintenance resources, since raw materials are not specialized. If one item requires fewer spares than
are expected, resources that might have been used for that item can be reallocated to cover demand from
an item that requires more spares than expected. As a result, ISM helps mitigate the impact of epistemic
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uncertainty.44 In addition, ISM provides the flexibility for the crew to manufacture items that may not
have been planned for, providing a powerful contingency option.44,74–76 ISM can also offer several other
benefits, including simplified inventory management, reduced logistics stowage volume requirements, and
opportunities to re-optimize system designs without launch packaging or loading constraints.43,44,70,72,74,75
One of the most significant benefits of ISM may be that it enables recycling and/or In-Situ Resource
Utilization (ISRU) for maintenance logistics. Recycling has been used to great effect for the reduction of
ECLSS consumables requirements on past spaceflight missions, and ISRU has the potential to reduce logistics
demands even further for crewed missions to the Moon and Mars.18,77–80 When ISM is available, recycling
and ISRU can be applied to spare parts in the same way that it is currently applied to water, oxygen, and
propellant. Failed components may be converted into raw materials that could be used to manufacture
new components, and new components may be manufactured on site using local materials. This would be
a revolutionary capability in maintenance logistics, drastically reducing the amount of mass required for
long-endurance missions.44,65,70–72,74,81–83
ISM is still a relatively new capability, and a significant amount of development effort remains before
ISM can be deployed in a mission-critical setting. This development and testing cost must be accounted
for in future mission planning when ISM is considered. In addition, ISM introduces new risks that must be
considered. For example, if ISM is to be used to manufacture critical components, then the ISM system may
become a common failure mode across several systems. Thus, the reliability and maintainability of such a
system is a critical consideration. In addition, the ISM system itself has mass and volume that must be
accounted for, in terms of both the emplaced system and any logistics that it may require.
The manufacturing capability of any ISM system is a critical concern. This includes available materi-
als, precision, surface finish, quality, and reliability of the manufacturing process. ISM capabilities place
constraints on the type and quality of part that can be manufactured in space. However, it is important
to bear in mind that the operational and logistical context of parts manufactured in space is different from
that of parts manufactured on Earth and launched into space, and therefore the optimal design may change
– especially if material recycling and/or ISRU are available. Therefore, component designs may change,
adapting to the constraints of an ISM system or to the different context provided when material can be
recycled or produced in situ.
Decisions regarding the implementation of ISM – including selection of specific components to produce in
space, which manufacturing capability to develop, whether or not to use recycling/ISRU, and what changes
to component and system design may be implemented to make full use of ISM – must carefully balance the
cost of ISM/recycling/ISRU system development, the cost of any design changes to components to enable
ISM, as well as additional logistics and risk against the potential logistics savings or risk mitigation provided
by an ISM capability. A more in-depth discussion of ISM and its potential benefits for human exploration
missions is presented by Owens and de Weck.44
G. Reduced Complexity
One of the primary drivers of spares mass for long-endurance missions is the large number of different types
of items for which spares must be provided. While the probability of any individual failure mode occurring
once (or multiple times) may be relatively low, the cumulative risk from all of them is relatively high, and it
is that cumulative risk that drives the supportability challenge. Most of the spare parts that are carried on
these future missions may never be used, but they are required for mitigation since there is no way to know
beforehand which spares will be needed.1 Reducing system complexity by lowering parts counts and using
simpler, more robust components may alleviate this effect and allow a reduction in the amount of spares
required for risk mitigation in addition to the reduction in spares resulting from the removal of items to
spare for.28 In addition, there is a need to balance the logistical benefits of spacecraft systems, especially
for ECLSS, that reduce the mass of consumables like water and oxygen that need to be carried against the
mass of spare parts required to maintain those systems to a desired POS and confidence. In some cases,
the cost of additional spares/maintenance logistics and crew time associated with more complex systems
may outweigh the benefits that those systems provide.8,52,53,57 Reducing the complexity of systems may
enable cost savings in development and testing in addition to logistics reduction, and simplification may also
reduce risk. These potential benefits should be weighed carefully against performance increases or logistics
reduction that could be achieved by more complex systems if they are implemented.
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H. Spares Inventory Selection
Once a system and mission context are defined – that is, after many of the above decisions are made – a
critical supportability decision remains: which, and how many, spares should be carried on the mission? A
fully-defined system results in a list of repairable items, each associated with characteristics such as mass,
failure rate (or failure rate distribution), and life limits. This list, along with mission characteristics such as
endurance, enable the calculation of probabilities associated with various risks, described in Section III.D.
Typically, a requirement will be set on POS and confidence or other risk metrics for a given mission, and
supportability modeling and optimization will be used to determine the allocation of spare parts that meets
that requirement for minimum mass. Optimization of spares allocations is a critical step – though there
will be many spares allocations that fulfill mission risk requirements, only one will do so while requiring the
minimum amount of logistics mass. Several discrete optimization approaches may be used to determine the
minimum-mass spares inventory, which are beyond the scope of this paper; however, a selection of references
that describe spares inventory optimization in greater detail is provided here.2,32,36,40,41,45,48,50,53,54 When
ISM is used, raw material for manufacturing is also included in the inventory optimization process.43,44
In addition to the selection of which and how many spares should be carried, inventory optimization
may include decisions regarding predeployment of a subset of spare parts to an exploration destination. The
use of slower, more efficient transit trajectories could reduce the propellant costs associated with logistics.
If future missions will visit the same exploration destination, then leftover logistics may be cached, or left
for future use. This approach could be particularly useful for spare parts; even though a large amount of
spares must be carried to cover potential failures, only a small number of spares are likely to actually be
used on the mission (though it is impossible to know which ones beforehand).1 The unused spares could be
cached for later use, thus reducing the amount of new spares that future missions must carry.57 However, if
cached spare parts are to be used on future missions, they must remain compatible with spacecraft systems.
Any upgrades to the system must either maintain compatibility with previous spares, or mission planners
must accept the additional logistics required to re-initialize the spares cache when a system changes. In
addition, predeployed and/or cached spares and maintenance items may spend years in space or waiting
at an exploration destination before use, and therefore the shelf life of these items must be taken into
consideration during mission planning.
V. Discussion
A. “Mean Time Between Failures” Can Be Misleading
Component reliability is typically characterized in terms of MTBF, which is the inverse of failure rate. This
term can be misleading, however. MTBF is not a direct description of the amount of time that a component
will operate before failing, but rather a parameter used to characterize a probability distribution. The
amount of time that a component will function, as well as the number of times a component may fail during
a mission, is a random variable. The component may fail before its MTBF is reached, or it may last beyond
it. Figure 1 shows the impact of MTBF and mission endurance on the probability of failure. The probability
that an item fails before the end of the mission is shown in red, while the probability that it does not
fail is shown in blue, as a function of the ratio of mission endurance to MTBF. These curves are generated
assuming the Constant Failure Rate (CFR) model, a commonly-used model for random failures that assumes
that component lifetimes are exponentially distributed.84 If MTBF is equal to the mission endurance, the
probability that a component will fail before the end of the mission is 0.63. Even if the MTBF is twice the
mission endurance, the probability of failure before the end of the mission is 0.39. Supportability analysis
that allocates spares using MTBF as an estimate for the deterministic lifetime of each item may significantly
underestimate risk. It is critical that spares logistics planning and risk analysis use MTBF to characterize
the probability of failure rather than use it interchangeably with component lifetimes.
B. Data Needs
To understand the supportability characteristics of a system, forecast logistics and crew time needs, and
inform system development and mission planning, supportability analysts need data. Failure rate estimates
for repairable items – ideally captured as probability distributions, characterized by a mean and error factor
(see Section IV.B) – are critical to forecasting spares demands, and can be derived from similarity to well-
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Figure 1. Probability that a component will (red) or will not (blue, dotted) fail before the end of the mission
as a function of the ratio between the mission endurance and component MTBF
understood systems or through statistical analysis of component operating histories. If failure rate estimates
are not readily available, failure histories consisting of either a set of component lifetimes or a count of the
number of failures that have been experienced by a particular component over time can be used to derive
those estimates. These component histories can also be used to generate trends and assess how much time
and effort may be required for further improvements in reliability or reduction in uncertainty. Similarly,
component life limit information is necessary to forecast maintenance demands. K-factors, multipliers on
failure rates to account for induced failures, are also necessary, as well as any shelf life limitations that must
be taken into account. Component mass and volume estimates are required to assess the cost of logistics.
To forecast crew time demands, estimates of the amount of time required for maintenance of each item are
necessary either as an MTTR estimate or a distribution with uncertainty. It is also important to understand
tools requirements associated with various maintenance activities. In order to investigate design options such
as lower levels of repair, these data must be available at multiple levels of repair (ORU, assembly, subassembly,
component, etc.). In addition, opportunities for commonality, ISM, ISRU, and material recycling must be
identified and characterized.
Mission experience is a critical source for these data. The ISS has provided and continues to provide
essential knowledge of spacecraft system behavior and operational challenges that are necessary for the
analysis of and planning for future missions. Data from continued ISS operations, commercial space stations,
and initial missions to cislunar space or other destinations will be extremely valuable to the understanding
of supportability for future space missions. Therefore, supportability data collection, organization, and
dissemination is an important part of spaceflight operations.
C. The Value of Sensitivity Analysis
A common challenge for supportability assessment is that early in mission lifecycles, when it is most valuable,
input data may not be available. It can be difficult to assess the mass or failure rate of components that have
not yet been designed. However, it is often possible to bound these and other characteristics and provide
a range of possible values, including perhaps a most likely estimate. Sensitivity analysis on the impact of
those values can be used to guide system designers and identify targets and breakpoints for those values (e.g.
reliability thresholds that must be achieved by a new component in order for it to provide a net benefit to
the system). Supportability analysis is not a one-way computation, but a flexible, multifaceted method to
forecast system behavior and inform mission design.
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VI. Conclusion
Supportability is a critical consideration for future human spaceflight missions. The supportability char-
acteristics of the systems that carry humans to Mars and back will be determined in part by decisions made
in the near future, and will be strong drivers of system lifecycle cost and risk. This paper has outlined the
many impacts that supportability has on cost, performance, schedule, and risk, as well as a set of strategies
that have been proposed to address these impacts. New approaches for supportability will be required to
enable safe and effective beyond-LEO human spaceflight. It is likely that no single supportability strategy
will be sufficient to enable cost-effective long-endurance human spaceflight. Holistic analysis and trade stud-
ies of the supportability metrics and decisions that are described and assessed in this paper, as well as in
the many papers referenced above, can help guide system development and mission planning to enable the
human spaceflight goals of the future.
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